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THE CONDITIONS OF LEGITIMACY: A 
RESPONSE TO JAMES WEINSTEIN 
Jeremy Waldron* 
I 
Thanks and congratulations are due to Professor Weinstein 
for his careful elaboration of the legitimacy-based argument 
against the regulation of hate speech.1 This is not the first 
formulation of the argument. Ronald Dworkin set out a briefer 
version of it in a “Foreword” he contributed to a volume entitled 
Extreme Speech and Democracy, edited by Weinstein and Ivan 
Hare.2 But his comments were not very extensive and perhaps 
they have been underestimated. Weinstein says that this line of 
argument is “often omitted from the litany of values [relevant to 
the hate speech debate] recognized by courts and 
commentators.”3 Weinstein himself thinks it is “the most powerful 
argument against hate speech bans.”4 
There have been gestures towards a political legitimacy 
argument in the work of other free speech scholars, who 
considered the significance of the connection between democracy 
and the foundations of the First Amendment. The first name that 
springs to mind is that of Alexander Meikeljohn; and some of 
Robert Post’s writings have continued this theme.5 Unfortunately 
that work was not much more than gestural: it did not propound 
the legitimacy argument in a way that opened it to serious analytic 
evaluation. But now at last—here—we have a version of the 
 
 * University Professor, School of Law, New York University. 
 1. James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, Democracy, and Political Legitimacy, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017). 
 2. RONALD DWORKIN, Foreword, in EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, at v-ix 
(Ivan Hare and James Weinstein eds., 2009). 
 3.  Weinstein, supra note 1, at 528 
 4.  Id. at 531 
 5. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (2000). 
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argument that is presented in a sustained and rigorous way, and 
the debate about free speech and hate speech is the better for it. 
I like to think I have contributed something to this increase 
in rigor by subjecting Dworkin’s version of the legitimacy 
argument to sustained exposition and critique over thirty pages in 
The Harm in Hate Speech, a book based on my 2009 Holmes 
Lectures at Harvard Law School.6 I will continue that enterprise 
in this paper, harping away at some of Weinstein’s formulations 
and questioning a few of the important points that he makes. This 
is not intended as disrespect, but as tribute to the seriousness of 
the argument he is making. For I think Weinstein agrees that it is 
important to ascertain whether the legitimacy argument against 
the regulation of hate speech is impressionistic only or whether it 
succeeds in identifying concerns that really ought to engage our 
attention. 
The topic is important but challenging. “Legitimacy” has a 
rather loose meaning in political philosophy. Its meaning can veer 
between the normative and the empirical, and between the basis 
of a state’s right to govern and the sentiment among its subjects 
that they have an obligation to obey. This indeterminacy is partly 
a function of its neglect in political theory, and we should welcome 
its being brought up in this context: better some discussion of it in 
the context of hate speech regulation than no discussion at all. 
When I began thinking about hate speech regulations, I was 
particularly struck by Ronald Dworkin’s invocation of legitimacy 
for previously he had been rather dismissive of the topic. In his 
1996 book Freedom’s Law, Dworkin defended judicial review by 
saying that if a political decision improved democracy, it didn’t 
much matter whether that decision came about through judicial 
procedures or through full participation. A judicial decision which 
established a basis for mutual respect, for example, would actually 
improve democracy by securing one of the conditions without 
which the moral claims of majority-rule would be non-existent. So 
there could be no democratic objection to it.7 
Dworkin seemed to be suggesting that when the conditions 
of democracy were at stake, procedural legitimacy did not matter. 
 
 6. JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH 173–203 (2012). 
 7. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 15–35 (1996).  For a critique of Dworkin’s argument, see 
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 282–302 (1999). 
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And if this were accepted, presumably the same might be said 
about public debate as well. The fact that a matter was decided 
without a full public debate would not matter to legitimacy if the 
decision-procedure that was used improved the conditions of 
democracy. But now, in the argument about hate speech, 
legitimacy is being taken much more seriously as a procedural 
value. It matters not just what laws we have but how they were 
enacted—by whose votes and under what conditions of 
deliberation. Dworkin and Weinstein are insisting that the 
enforcement of good laws, however just they are in their content, 
may be illegitimate if the conditions under which they were 
enacted did not include unrestricted debate as well as the fair 
processes of representative democracy. 
This twist in Dworkin’s approach to legitimacy is particularly 
interesting because a case might be made that hate speech laws 
are actually aimed at securing the conditions of democracy in 
precisely the fashion that Dworkin indicated in Freedom’s Law. 
He said there that majority-voting is hardly a legitimate mode of 
political decision among people who have contempt for one 
another or where there is hatred between various factions. Any 
partisan of democracy needs to be concerned therefore about 
actions that are calculated to stir up such hatred and contempt. 
Since that is precisely the concern of hate speech laws, a case can 
be made—if we accept Dworkin’s view in Freedom’s Law—that 
hate speech restrictions contribute positively to democratic 
legitimacy by helping sustain some of the conditions of democracy 
as well as detracting from democratic legitimacy—if Dworkin and 
Weinstein are right—by interfering with free speech. 
In discussing a similar view held by Alexander Brown,8 
Weinstein says that it is difficult to weigh these opposite 
legitimacy effects against one another. He thinks one is systemic 
and the other isn’t—“The work done by these two types of 
legitimacy is very different”—and this makes balancing difficult.9 
But that does not mean that Brown’s concern can be dismissed or 
ignored. Back of all the points I am going to make in this essay 
 
 8. ALEXANDER BROWN, HATE SPEECH LAW: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
(2015). 
 9. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 697. “Legitimacy” does systemic work when it is 
concerned with the overall moral status of a state or legal system; it does non-systemic 
work when it is used to evaluate the status of some particular law or policy or governmental 
action. 
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responding to Weinstein is a worry that the argument about 
political legitimacy is just being wheeled into the hate speech 
debate opportunistically by people who have never otherwise 
shown that they take it seriously. I want to make sure that the 
argument is not just being rigged up for the purposes of the hate 
speech debate. One way of showing that it is not rigged would be 
to commit to following the legitimacy principle where it leads—in 
favor of some hate speech regulation as well as against it. 
II 
In this spirit, before addressing the substance of the case that 
Weinstein makes, I want to identify a few areas where his 
arguments are potentially misleading or where they exaggerate 
the concerns that he points to. The gist of his case is that hate 
speech restrictions placed upon speakers in a polity can 
sometimes—and do often—have the effect of diminishing the 
legitimacy of the measures that the speakers are discussing. That 
case is important and it needs to be addressed head on. But it is 
best to do so without distractions 
A first point is that the case Weinstein is making obviously 
depends on the nature of the restrictions. A restriction on what 
may be said is one thing; the total exclusion of an individual from 
public discourse is another. Proponents of the legitimacy 
argument are sometimes as loose as they think they can get away 
with on this matter.10 So, for example, there are passages where 
Weinstein appears to imply that hate speech restrictions lead to 
total exclusion. He talks about the “silencing” effect of hate 
speech laws.11 And he quotes himself as having said in an earlier 
article that legitimacy becomes problematic “[i]f an individual is 
excluded from participating in public discourse because the 
government disagrees with the speaker’s views or because it finds 
the ideas expressed too disturbing or offensive.”12 
 
 10. So for example, Dworkin complains that the effect of hate speech laws is that 
certain people are “forbidden to raise a voice in protest or argument or objection” against 
some proposals for law. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 579. And Weinstein notes Robert 
Post’s claim “that hate speech restrictions undermine legitimacy by excluding those with 
bigoted views from participating in the formation of public opinion.” Id. at 578 (emphasis 
added). 
 11. Id. at 579. 
 12. Id. at 529 (quoting James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 
97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011)). 
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It is as though such laws were to identify racists (for example) 
by name and forbid them from voting and from speaking. Maybe 
such legislation is imaginable: some regimes in recent memory 
have imposed comprehensive disenfranchisement upon 
individuals on account of their “hateful” views about socialism or 
whatever. But I know of nothing called “hate speech legislation” 
in modern democracies which has or is intended to have this 
effect. And I don’t think we should take this possibility as our 
exemplar. 
A more helpful formulation is that such legislation means 
that certain speakers are “forbidden from expressing a particular 
view.”13 But even this is hyperbole. Most hate speech laws forbid 
only speech acts that are intended to have a certain effect—
namely the stirring up of hatred in a community against a section 
of or a group within that community. The self-same proposition 
uttered patently without such intention or in a manner or in 
circumstances in which it would not be reasonable for the speaker 
to have foreseen such an effect is not prohibited. (To this extent, 
I would like to qualify my concession in The Harm in Hate Speech 
that hate speech restrictions are undoubtedly content-based: they 
are sort of content-based, but mostly they get at content only by 
virtue of its intended effect on the community, rather than on the 
sole basis of the propositions expressed.)14 
Moreover, most hate speech restrictions add to this a 
requirement that the speech which is intended to have the effect 
just mentioned must also be expressed in a certain manner before 
it is liable to prosecution. So, for example, section 18(1) of the 
UK’s Public Order Act dealing with racial hate speech stipulates 
that prosecution is possible only against 
A person who uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or 
behaviour, or displays any written material which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting … if— (a) he intends thereby 
to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the 
circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.15 
In other words, the language used has to have a threatening, 
abusive, and insulting character as well as the specific intent just 
mentioned. Absent such character or absent such intent, the 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Compare WALDRON, supra note 6, at 150–55. 
 15. Public Order Act 1986, UK ST 1986, c. 64, pt. III, § 18. 
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expression of a given view is not prohibited. So it is misleading to 
say that hate speech restrictions prohibit the expression of certain 
views per se. 
Notice by the way that section 18(1) makes “threatening, 
abusive or insulting words or behaviour” necessary, not sufficient 
for the offense. There still must be the intent to stir up racial 
hatred. It is true that British law also has other provisions—public 
order provisions, not hate speech provisions—which prohibit the 
use of threatening or abusive words or behavior, or disorderly 
behavior “within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be 
caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby”: that is the effect of 
section 5 of the Public Order Act.16 But that is not a hate speech 
provision and its operation is quite separate—and controversies 
about it are quite separate—from prohibitions on hate speech. 
Not everything that restricts speech or protects people from abuse 
counts as a hate speech restriction, even if it is found in the same 
omnibus statute. Section 5 is more like a fighting words provision 
or a public order provision, and the issues raised by regulations 
with this orientation are quite different from those raised by the 
hate speech provision. The latter has a specific evil in mind: the 
proliferation of racial hatred in a community. The former is aimed 
at a different evil—namely public disorder. If Professor Weinstein 
wants to make a case that section 5 of the UK’s Public Order Act 
is over-inclusive either on its face or as applied in recent cases, I 
will gladly join him. It has nothing to do with our disagreement 
about hate speech. 
I labor this point because Weinstein cites the invocation of 
section 5 of the Public Order Act in a number of British cases—
the cases of Mark Norwood, Harry Hammond, Shawn Holes, and 
Michael Overd—to illustrate his contention that hate speech laws 
make it quite difficult to safely express the basic “propositional 
content” of bigoted views even when expressed without 
vituperation or use of vicious epithets.17 He believes these cases 
show that most hate speech laws, whatever their intent, manifestly 
do not in practice provide a “safe haven” for expressing 
“something like the propositional content” of bigoted views that 
become illegal only “when expressed as vituperation.”18 
 
 16. Public Order Act 1986, UK ST 1986, c. 64, pt. I, § 5(1). 
 17. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 554–57. 
 18. Id. at 560. 
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Weinstein regards the cases cited in this paragraph as crucial for 
his argument. He says that his discussion of these British examples 
involves “examination of the actual operation of hate speech laws 
in force.”19 Yet none of them involves the use of British hate 
speech provisions such as section 18(1). They are all about the 
enforcement of public order provisions which are formulated 
without reference to the stirring up of racial hatred. 
True, in one of the cases that Weinstein cites, the case of 
Mark Norwood, the violation of section 5 led to an aggravated 
penalty because the violation was found to be “motivated (wholly 
or partly) by hostility towards members of a racial or religious 
group” under sections 28 and 31 of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998.20 I hope Professor Weinstein will not regard it as pedantic 
of me to point out that this is a hate crime provision not a hate 
speech provision. As I said in my book, 
though the two ideas—hate speech and hate crimes—do have 
a distant connection, they really raise quite different issues in 
our thinking about law. The idea of hate crimes is an idea that 
definitely does focus on motivation: it treats the harboring of 
certain motivations in regard to unlawful acts like assault or 
murder as a distinct element of crime or as an aggravating 
factor. But in most hate speech legislation, hatred is relevant 
not as the motivation of certain actions, but as a possible effect 
of certain forms of speech.21 
Hate crime provisions can involve the aggravation of offenses 
of all sorts, beatings as well as speakings. There are hate crimes 
provisions all over American statute books—in forty-five states 
and in the federal Civil Rights Act. They are controversial, 
certainly (and I am not sure what Professor Weinstein’s view of 
them is); but it is a different controversy than the one about hate 
speech. 
No doubt there are hate speech laws in the world expressed 
less carefully, with less attention to these fastidious distinctions 
than the British provisions I have cited. But our debate is about 
hate speech restrictions as such, not about the least well-
formulated of them. Just as I will try to make the legitimacy 
 
 19. Id. at 554. 
 20. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 554–55 (quoting Norwood v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, [2003] EWHC 1564 (Admin), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin
/2003/1564.html). 
 21. WALDRON, supra note 6, at 35. 
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argument the best it can be (before refuting it), so opponents of 
hate speech regulation ought to consider the best case that can be 
made for regulation of this sort and the best drafting that has 
emerged from fifty years or more of legislative experience in most 
advanced democracies before attempting to show that 
nevertheless such regulations are wrong in principle. 
III 
With these points taken care of, let us turn now to the issue 
of principle. Does the enactment and enforcement of hate speech 
prohibitions undermine political legitimacy in our society? How 
is this undermining supposed to work? 
Like Weinstein,22 I shall use the helpful terminology of 
upstream and downstream laws.23 Downstream laws are laws that 
are enacted by the political process; upstream laws are laws that 
affect the political process. (Of course upstream laws must also 
have been enacted; they are in that sense downstream also. But I 
will use “downstream” to refer to laws that are the product of the 
political process without being intended also to affect the political 
process.) A downstream law (Ld) may be a law against 
discrimination (say, discrimination against same-sex couples in 
public accommodations). An upstream law (Lu) may a law 
prohibiting speech which is calculated to stir up hatred against 
members of the LGBT community. Weinstein’s position is that 
the enforcement of Lu may make a difference to the legitimacy of 
Ld. A free and open political debate in the community is so 
important to political legitimacy that any law such as Lu that seeks 
to limit or moderate the contributions that a given citizen, P, may 
make to the debate about Ld compromises the legitimacy of Ld as 
enacted in these circumstances. 
Now Weinstein has acknowledged that the impact on 
legitimacy may not be drastic; that is, it may not make Ld literally 
unenforceable. He seems to accept the retraction by Ronald 
Dworkin of a very aggressive initial version of the legitimacy 
argument, namely, that the enforcement of hate speech laws 
destroys the legitimacy of laws like Ld.24 Under pressure Dworkin 
 
 22. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 530. 
 23. The terminology was introduced by Dworkin, in DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii, 
and followed in WALDRON, supra note 6, at 78-79. 
 24. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii says that we cannot suppress hate speech “without 
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had to concede that political legitimacy was a matter of degree, 
and he retreated to the view that the relevant effect on legitimacy 
was diminution rather than destruction.25 Weinstein I think agrees 
with that. Still, he believes the effect can be considerable, 
particularly when there are already other difficulties with Ld and 
its enforcement. 
In one other regard, Weinstein’s position is more modest 
than Dworkin’s. Dworkin wanted to say that the enactment and 
enforcement of a hate speech law may have a general and 
pervasive impact on downstream political legitimacy. He didn’t 
think it could be limited to an effect on just one law. This is 
because, as he understood it, a lot of what is forbidden as hate 
speech is not tailored as an intervention in any particular 
legislative debate: 
A community’s legislation and policy are determined more by 
its moral and cultural environment, the mix of its people’s 
opinions, prejudices, tastes, and attitudes than by editorial 
columns or party political broadcasts or stump political 
speeches. It is as unfair to impose a collective decision on 
someone who has not been allowed to contribute to that moral 
environment, by expressing his political or social convictions or 
tastes or prejudices informally, as on someone whose 
pamphlets against the decision were destroyed by the police.26 
It follows that the enforcement of hate speech laws against P 
may make a difference to the legitimacy of Ld even if P’s 
intervention was not directed at the debate about Ld in particular. 
The flip side of this is that the enforcement of a hate speech law 
(Lu) may actually make a difference to the legitimacy of all our 
enacted laws, because they are all supposed to be enacted (or 
protected from amendment or repeal) in an atmosphere of free 
and general debate about social purposes and ideals. It has a 
wholesale effect, according to Dworkin, partly because of these 
points about the diffuse nature of public debate and partly 
because legitimacy might be a systemic attribute—an attribute of 
 
forfeiting our moral title to force such people to bow to the collective judgments that do 
make their way into the statute books.” See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 529 (quoting 
DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii). 
 25. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 530, cites Dworkin as acknowledging in an e-mail to 
Waldron that “[o]n balance Britain is entitled to enforce such laws, I think, but we are left 
with a deficit in legitimacy—something to regret under that title—because of the 
censorship.” 
 26. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii. 
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a whole political system—rather than an attribute of particular 
laws.27 I think Weinstein does not accept this. Certainly for the 
purposes of our argument here, Weinstein is interested in a more 
focused impact: the retail effect on the legitimacy of Ld as a result 
of the enforcement of Lu in the debate about Ld. He seems to 
suggest that the only laws whose legitimacy is affected by hate 
speech regulation are those directly related to the content of the 
hate speech under restriction. For example, he says: “laws 
forbidding people from expressing the view . . . that 
homosexuality is immoral or disordered, can destroy the moral 
justification for enforcing laws against sexual-orientation 
discrimination.”28 
Weinstein’s position is more focused in another way too. He 
is interested in the legitimacy effect of the hate speech law on 
particular people—namely, the people whose interventions in a 
legislative debate are affected (for example, deterred) by the hate 
speech law. It is the legitimacy of the downstream law so far as 
these people are concerned that Weinstein wants to focus on. I 
don’t think he takes a position on whether there is any impact on 
the legitimacy of enforcing Ld against people other than P—for 
example, people to whom it would never occur to make an 
intervention of the kind prohibited by Lu or indeed people who 
have cheerfully made other less vicious contributions, even if still 
adversarial, in the debate about Ld. 
I worry that this aspect of Weinstein’s position may get 
tangled up in Rule-of-Law issues about generality. Hate speech 
laws are presented as quite general: they forbid anyone from 
stirring up hatred against racial and religious groups and people 
identified by sexual orientation. Even if they only have to be 
enforced against a few extremists, they have a potential impact on 
everyone’s speech. To the extent that this is so, it may be hard to 
identify the basis for in personam illegitimacy of the type that 
Weinstein’s position suggests. 
Anyway, all of this presupposes that we are in possession of 
a theory of political legitimacy (not specifically invented for this 
debate) that enables us to make these subtle differentiations. I 
 
 27. As I have already mentioned, Weinstein does not want to acknowledge the 
systemic impact of hate speech laws on political legitimacy. If he did, he would not be able 
to rely on an alleged incommensurability between systemic and non-systemic effects 
systematicity in his response to Alexander Brown. See supra text accompanying note 8. 
 28. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 527. 
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mean a theory of political legitimacy that is not just rigged to yield 
this result. I do believe that Dworkin’s wholesale position is 
untenable: I mean his view that the enforcement of a hate speech 
law diminishes the legitimacy of all subsequently enacted 
downstream laws so far as all citizens are concerned. Some 
readers will think that the best explanation of why Weinstein has 
focused the legitimacy argument as he does is simply to make it 
come out as less implausible than Dworkin’s wholesale version. 
The only way of refuting that suspicion would be to show us an 
independently-justified argument about political legitimacy that 
would enable us to make these differentiations. Weinstein makes 
a brave attempt at this task, but (as I shall now show) I think he 
fails. 
IV 
What makes our laws legitimate? I have heard moral 
philosophers say that the best argument for the legitimacy of our 
laws (or of any particular law (L)) is a showing that the laws are 
morally justified or that L in particular is morally justified. 
Weinstein—I think—accepts this so far as certain rudimentary 
laws of social order are concerned, such as laws against murder 
and rape.29 This is one way in which he begins to narrow things 
down to his focused position: the enforcement of Lu does not 
impact the legitimacy of these rudimentary laws since their 
legitimacy is purely a matter of content not process. 
However, for most of our laws, there is good-faith 
disagreement in the political community about whether they are 
justified on their merits. And the problem of legitimacy is to find 
a basis on which a law may permissibly be enforced even against 
people who disagree with its content. What we usually say is that 
the enforceability of L is legitimate because of the way in which L 
was adopted even in the face of this disagreement. In modern 
democracies, laws are adopted by debate and voting in 
constitutionally structured legislatures. The legislatures are 
populated in their turn by elected representatives. The elected 
representatives consider bills that are put before them, and they 
debate their merits. The upshot of those debates is a vote in the 
various houses of the legislature. These debates and decisions in 
 
 29.  Weinstein, supra note 1, at 538. 
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a representative legislature are usually seen as legitimizing the 
enforcement as law of the bills that survive this process. 
Now so far, there is no foothold for an argument about 
legitimacy based on the impact of hate speech prohibitions. 
Speech in parliament is usually privileged. I am not aware of any 
case where a legislator has been prosecuted or threatened with 
prosecution in respect to the hateful intention of his remarks in a 
legislative debate. Certainly such an application is far from 
typical. So how exactly is it that the prohibition of hate speech 
undermines the legitimacy of the enforcement of a downstream 
law? I think we have to look at aspects of political procedure that 
go beyond parliamentary debate. We might consider the 
possibility of laws enacted by initiative; but I shall put that to one 
side. The best case for the Weinstein argument looks at the 
informal public debate that is involved in the election and 
electoral accountability of legislators and in the debates in the 
community that complement legislative debates in the parliament. 
Legislation is enacted by representatives, but representatives 
are supposed to be elected in a process that directly involves the 
people, where the people talk with one another—less formally 
now than in representative debate in the legislature—and then 
vote. So perhaps we should consider the impact of upstream laws 
like hate speech laws on that part of the process. Also legislation 
is a public matter. When bills are being considered in the 
legislature and public policy debated more generally in our 
political institutions, we expect that the formal debate among the 
elected legislators will be echoed by less formal and more diffuse 
debate on the issues in civil society. We expect that the two 
different arenas of debate will influence each other, so that 
anything that is said in the streets, on the blogs, or in the 
newspapers might potentially affect things that are said and votes 
that are cast in the legislature (and vice versa). Of course there is 
no guarantee. My letter to the newspaper may not be published; 
there may be no hits on my blog; eyes may be turned away from 
my graffiti; my spoken words may disappear into the wind; 
perhaps no one will turn up for the meetings I organize; and the 
leaflets I distribute may end up in the gutter (from whence they 
came). Still it is part of our conception of the legitimate political 
process that it faces like this in both ways. 
It is this broader debate that must be the focus of the 
argument that Weinstein and Dworkin want to make about hate 
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speech. Weinstein quotes Hans Kelsen as having explained this to 
us in the middle of the last century: 
The will of the community, in a democracy, is always created 
through a running discussion between majority and minority, 
through free consideration of arguments for and against a 
certain regulation of a subject matter. This discussion takes 
place not only in parliament, but also, and foremost, at political 
meetings, in newspapers, books, and other vehicles of public 
opinion. A democracy without public opinion is a contradiction 
in terms.30 
Weinstein adds: “It is through public opinion that the people, 
the ultimate governors in a democratic society, control their 
representatives between elections.”31 
But here is where things become difficult. It is one thing to 
say that public deliberation—chaotic and unformed as it is—is an 
indispensable part of the political process. It is quite another thing 
to infer direct conclusions about the legitimacy of the laws from 
particular aspects of that deliberation. And that is what Weinstein 
wants to do. He wants to reach a point at which we can say that P 
has a right to disobey Ld or a right that it not be enforced against 
him if the process that led to the enactment of Ld is tainted in some 
way (that has to do with P). If the effect of the laws governing 
public discourse is that P’s intended intervention must be made in 
a way that doesn’t necessarily correspond to the exact way in 
which P wanted to intervene, then, according to Weinstein, the 
moral justification for enforcing (against P or against everyone) 
some or all of the laws whose enactment is the upshot of the 
overall process is diminished. This is supposed to be a focused 
deontic effect (on P’s rights) that flows from the character of the 
political process that was used. Now, as Weinstein knows, I want 
to dispute the whole argument. But suppose one were to concede 
that hate speech laws have a deleterious impact on the quality of 
the political process; are we then in a position to infer a deontic 
conclusion about P’s rights? The most I would concede is that 
something has gone wrong with the character of public debate 
overall. Individualizing its moral effects to generate particular 
 
 30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 539–40 (quoting HANS KELSEN, A GENERAL 
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 287–88 (A. Wedberg trans., 1945). 
 31. This is almost Weinstein’s only mention of representative democracy or the role 
of representatives in debating and voting on our laws. 
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rights is the difficulty. Is there any good political argument that 
works like this? 
Suppose someone is wrongfully disenfranchised. He can 
speak but it turns out he can’t vote. For example, all over the 
United States at the moment, there are laws restricting access to 
early voting and rules imposing onerous voter-ID requirements. 
Some of these may have the effect of making it much harder—
perhaps on the day impossible—for a particular voter, let’s call 
him Q, to cast his ballot. This is a deplorable state of affairs 
(assuming there is no justification for these voting restrictions on 
the process). But few people believe that any of the laws enacted 
by the legislature (to whose membership Q’s vote might have 
made the sort of difference that individual votes make in 
elections) are rendered illegitimate as a result either in general 
or—if this makes sense—so far as Q is concerned. No one thinks 
Q now has the right to disobey the laws or not have them enforced 
against him. His disenfranchisement may make the democracy 
poorer, and Q certainly has a justified complaint; but nothing 
follows about legitimacy and enforcement so far as his relation to 
the laws is concerned. And if this doesn’t follow for Q in the 
relatively formalized context of voting, how can it possibly be true 
of the slight impact that hate-speech laws have on the manner of 
P’s expression in a diffuse free-wheeling debate? Q, as I said, has 
a complaint; and maybe P does as well. But Q’s complaint doesn’t 
give rise to a legitimacy problem. And if this is true of citizen Q, 
then Weinstein’s contention cannot possibly be true of P. 
Even when we talk about the franchise we are never dealing 
with a perfect voting system. Its flaws and its vicissitudes do not 
have an individualized impact on political legitimacy. And when 
we move from the franchise to the swirling maelstrom of informal 
debate, we have no way of keeping track of who says what to 
whom, who speaks and who listens. People in their millions say all 
sorts of things and contribute more or less articulately in all sorts 
of ways; and the same thing can be said in lots of different ways, 
often depending on particular political and personal dynamics of 
a particular situation. Most people say nothing; others only snarl 
and mutter to their friends. As Dworkin has noted in another 
context there is no way of equalizing political influence in these 
debates; there is barely any way of conceiving what political 
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equality would amount to in this context.32 The best we can do is 
to say that everyone may participate as they like, though everyone 
agrees there are limits on how inflammatory their participation 
can be. No one has a right that his speech have any particular 
effect on political outcomes. As I said earlier, most political 
speech does not. And if—for reasons of social peace—limits are 
placed on other effects that inflammatory speech may have, I 
don’t think the background public discourse is orderly enough to 
enable us to infer precise deontic conclusions about the individual 
rights that flow or do not flow from the political process. 
Notice that what I have said doesn’t deny that the hate speech 
laws may have an impact on legitimacy; what I am denying is that 
they have an impact on the state’s right to enforce particular laws 
against individuals. For all I have said so far, hate speech laws may 
adversely affect the legitimacy of the political system. But that is 
a systemic effect, and—for the reasons I have stated—at worst a 
negligible effect. 
As already noted, Weinstein is not happy with this systemic 
approach to legitimacy. To defend his more focused deontic 
orientation, he introduces considerations about the equal 
protection of interests. “[E]ach individual in society is of equal 
moral worth and therefore is entitled to have his or her interests 
treated with equal respect by government.”33 But then we are 
back with the problem of hyperbole. The impact of hate speech 
laws is most definitely not to say that the interests of racists are 
not to be served by our laws: racists have the benefit of health 
care, education, roads, housing and so on, and none of this is 
denied to them when they are told that they may not stir up racial 
hatred. That prohibition may be enforced, but still the interests of 
those whom it is enforced against may still be served by the 
political system. 
The point can’t possibly be about interests. It must be about 
respect for opinions—and not just respect for the substance of 
certain opinions, but respect for the manner in which the persons 
respected would like to express them. Even in this branch of the 
argument there is a still a danger of hyperbole. The main way in 
which we express people’s opinions in the political process is by 
 
 32. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality?—Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F.L.R. 1, 
812 (1987–1988). 
 33. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 536. 
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counting their votes, and we do count the votes of those whose 
free expression is impacted by hate speech laws. Weinstein quotes 
Dworkin as saying that the possibility of each person’s 
participation in politics is important “to confirm his or her 
standing as a responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, 
collective action.”34 But again one could say that there is not 
necessarily any lack of respect for persons in the enforcement of 
hate speech laws. It is rather that persons are respected as playing 
a role that carries with it—as Dworkin’s language emphasizes—a 
certain responsibility to the political process overall. 
V 
This brings me to the question of the relation between 
political legitimacy and the justification of hate speech 
restrictions. I believe that if hate speech restrictions are justified—
particularly if the justification has itself a positive relation to the 
integrity of the political process—then even the argument about 
systemic effects on legitimacy will not go through. After all, if it is 
only unjustified restrictions on speech that affect legitimacy, then 
it looks as though we will have to settle the question of 
justification first, before we assess the impact on legitimacy. (So 
the argument about legitimacy can hardly be cited as a reason for 
thinking the hate speech laws are wrongful.) 
Let us begin by asking: are all restrictions on speech 
supposed to affect political legitimacy? For example, restrictions 
on child pornography, true threats, malicious defamation, or 
incitement? Or only restrictions that are unjustified? Weinstein 
knows he has to respond to this argument. He says: 
Waldron insists that banning vicious hate speech “probably has 
no greater effect on political legitimacy than banning fighting 
words or these other acknowledged exceptions to the free-
speech principle,” such as “obscenity” (by which Waldron 
seems to mean profanity), “individual libel of private persons, 
disorderly conduct,” or child pornography. In support of this 
conclusion he asks us to imagine that some people are so 
incensed about a proposed “downstream” law that “they want 
to shout ‘Fuck!’ in public, or challenge the legislation’s 
proponents to a fight, . . . or display child pornography” in 
opposition to the proposed legislation. Because these 
particular forms of expression are undoubtedly harmful, and 
 
 34. See Weinstein,  supra note 1, at 529 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 2, at vii). 
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because these protestors “can express their opposition to the 
downstream laws without resorting to obscenity . . . or the 
display of child pornography,” Waldron concludes that it is 
“reasonable” to ask them to do so. For this reason he concludes 
that “the loss of downstream legitimacy incurred as a result of 
the banning of speech of these particular kinds is minimal or 
nonexistent.”35 
His response is that hate speech laws are distinguished from 
these other (possibly justified) restrictions by being “viewpoint-
based.”36 I have already expressed some new reservations about 
this way of describing them.37 Hate speech restrictions—of the 
sort we considered in section II—are not based on viewpoint per 
se, but on the manner of their expression and the effect they are 
intended to have on social peace. Anyway, why should the nature 
of the restriction—viewpoint-based or non-viewpoint-based—
make all the difference here? Someone is still being prevented 
from saying what he wants to say as he says it. To that effect there 
is still an impact on the quality of public debate: it is not as it would 
be if there were no restrictions. And if a citizen thinks of himself 
as the sort of person who shouts “fuck” or utters threats in 
political debate or shows dirty pictures during his political 
orations, then—I don’t know—maybe a case can be made that he 
is not being respected as such. He is, however, being respected as 
someone who could be better than that, and as someone who has 
responsibilities as well as rights in the political process. But that is 
another matter. 
I return then to the position I mentioned at the beginning of 
our discussion in section I, the position raised by Alexander 
Brown, among others.38 There are such things as the conditions of 
democracy: Dworkin was happy to insist on this when he wasn’t 
talking about hate speech.39 In order to sustain a healthy working 
democracy, a society needs social peace and it is entitled to the 
assistance of citizens in maintaining that peace—or at least their 
assistance in not trying to disrupt it. Democracy requires trust 
among those of different views and different communities, and 
stirring up hatred is a way of undermining that trust. Also—and I 
think Dworkin is right about this in Freedom’s Law—the moral 
 
 35. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 544 (quoting WALDRON, supra note 6, at 182–83). 
 36. Id. at 540. 
 37. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 38. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
 39. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 33. 
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conditions for the legitimacy of democracy include a degree of 
respect that citizens need to have for one another, when they put 
their fate in others’ hands by accepting the outcome of a majority 
vote. This is not a sensible thing to do when you are a member of 
a population that is held in contempt by others. So again, we 
might—at a minimum—require citizens to refrain from trying to 
whip up some contempt in their interventions in public debate. 
Well-drafted hate speech laws are calculated to help maintain 
social peace and secure dignity and respect among members of 
the community. Weinstein thinks that any such attempt 
necessarily undermines the conditions of respect that are required 
for a legitimate democracy. I am grateful for the opportunity to 
show in these few pages that that is an artificial and one-sided 
view of the matter. 
 
